The Group

As humans, we claim to know things about the world. Often we also claim to know what is good and which behavior is right. We do so regularly and without paying heed to arguments (such as those of epistemic communitarians) that our knowledge claims are only socially stable opinions, rather than genuine insights. We comment on views and actions tout court, and therefore make normative claims. Examining normativity as it plays out in the various facets of the condition humaine and modern social world is the main aim of our philosophical work.

In working towards this goal, our methodology is the philosophical analysis of concepts and their synthesis. In doing so we strive to take into account a fundamental fact: specific concepts have paradigmatic cases for their application, and these cases are embedded in historically variable views as well as in specific social and scientific practices. Combining these approaches allows us to blend the high explanatory standards of analytic philosophy and the thick, historical empiricism of judgment and action derived from everyday practices and science.

Another central topic is developing a theory of knowledge (Erkennen) that is not led by the pros and cons of skepticism. How should we conceive of the cognitive (rather than simply causal) relation to the world that we entertain once we have knowledge about the world? In practice, this amounts to revitalizing an epistemology that distinguishes between epistemically better and worse methods of belief formation.

We cooperate with the ETH’s other Chair for Philosophy, as well as with the Chair for Science Studies, the Chair for History of Technology, and the Professorship for Practical Philosophy.